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Spotify, may be shared in particular social situations. We draw from agency theory’s focus on principal–agent
relationships and Goffman’s work on frames in analysing situations where others are allowed to use personal
accounts, either for a shared purpose or on behalf of the account owner. We deploy Goffman’s concepts of
regrounding to understand how interests behind activities are transformed and brackets to draw attention to
the boundaries of different frames, and how these are incurred or broken in situations that exceed personal
account use. Based on a set of 43 written descriptions of account sharing, we depict how employing others
to act as agents to use one’s personal accounts may lead to playful or serious use. Additionally, we discuss
consequentiality of sharing personalised services, considering both what services might reveal about the
account owner and how sharing takes place in the context of relationships. We contribute by illustrating how
users’ relationships with personalised services are complicated by the different interests that are served when
accounts are shared.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Streaming services like Netflix use recommender algorithms to predict what we might like to
spend time watching, drawing on data about us. Similarly, dating services such as Tinder try to
predict who we might like to spend time watching Netflix with. We often engage personalised
services with others, by letting them use our accounts [e.g. 48] or by using such services together
[e.g. 46]. Sometimes, in turn, we use other people’s accounts on their behalf. Prior research has
illustrated how people share accounts and devices with others and use them collaboratively [e.g.
6, 27, 38, 45]. While some services are designed with such collaborative use in mind (modern
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co-authoring tools being one prime example [e.g. 24]), the personalisation integral to many popular
services by definition implies and assumes individualistic use.
We conducted an empirical study of situations where personalised services are used in social
settings, focusing primarily on instances where the owner of an account gives it for someone else to
use. We approach the shared use of personalised services by examining how relationships between
individuals and their interests unfold in relation to these services in different frames of activity.
Our research questions focus on (1) the different interests served in situations of shared use of
personalised services, (2) how these interests are related to the current frame of the activity, and (3)
how the relationships between different frames are (or are not) managed.
We collected altogether 43 written, empirical accounts depicting how matchmaking and person-
alised services are shared in the everyday. We were both interested in (1) matchmaking services
where individuals have a profile that is visible for others and the main activity is related to in-
teracting with others and in (2) streaming services geared for offering experiences tailored for
individuals’ personal tastes. Driven by our research materials, our analysis focuses primarily on the
dating application Tinder, the music streaming service Spotify, and Netflix, a platform for streaming
movies and TV shows. Theoretically, we draw from agency theory [e.g. 28, 40] and Goffman’s
frame analysis [13].
In presenting our findings, we discuss motivations for account sharing briefly to set the scene.
Our main findings, then, describe how allowing others to use one’s personal accounts – that is,
authorising agents to act on one’s behalf – can complicate the account owner’s relationship with
personalised services. First, in regards to authorising another person to use Tinder or other services
where an individual has a profile from which to interact with other service users, we found a
continuum from serious to playful shared use. We refer with serious use to situations where the
authorised individual acts in line with the account owner’s long-term interests when using their
account. With playful use, we refer to activities such as making choices that the account owner
would not make, for the purposes of (mutual) amusement. Second, our results illuminate that when
others use services that are personalised based on prior, individual behavior, the service may end up
revealing something about the account owner. When used in social situations, the prior usage data
collected by these services do not necessarily match with the interests of those currently engaging
the service – and, subsequently, after instances of sharing, personalised content may not match the
account owner’s wishes and expectations.
When we consider not only other humans but also recommendation algorithms as potential
agents, it becomes clear that the two encounter different problems in acting on the account owners’
situation-specific interests. Most importantly, algorithms are blind to the frame of the situation
and incapable of reflexivity, while other individuals are not. On the other hand, human agents may
have conflicting interests in acting on behalf of someone while trying to simultaneously attain
their own goals [40]. Our study contributes to the understanding of personalised services in social
situations by drawing attention to how the interests that are served in these situations complicate
the relationship between the account owner and the service.
2 BACKGROUND
In the following, we first discuss prior research on the sharing of personal accounts and devices,
considering both account sharing and co-located, cooperative uses of technology. We then introduce
our theoretical starting points in agency theory [28, 40], with primary emphasis on principal–agent
relationships, and Goffman’s frame analysis [13].
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2.1 Shared use of services and devices
Prior research within the Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) community has drawn
attention to practices such as password sharing [44] and the sharing of personal devices and accounts
[e.g. 22, 27, 48]. While prior research has considered sharing of a variety of things, ranging from
individual preferences to physical and virtual objects [12], our focus is on how personal accounts
on online services are shared between individuals. For example, in a study of device sharing within
families, Matthews et al. [27] found the categories of borrowing, mutual use, help-seeking (often
for setting up a device), and broadcasting for mutual viewing. In addition, they point out that
sharing is sometimes accidental: individuals may grab devices that they at a glance believe to be
theirs, but which actually belong to other household members. As another example, Jacobs, Cramer
& Barkhuus [21] examined couples’ intentional and unintentional sharing practices regarding
personal accounts and devices, focusing both on participants’ sharing practices and the boundaries
of what they considered shared and private in the context of an intimate relationship. Furthermore,
scholars have also discussed how digital services are so intertwined with our relationships with each
other that when relationships fall apart these services complicate the breakup: necessary actions,
such as dividing digital asset, may prove difficult [29], and digital traces left by our interactions with
others persist after relationships end [20], sometimes causing distress and making it harder to move
on. Thematically close to our focus in this paper, Sun, Oliveira & Lewandowski [46] considered
shared uses of YouTube and found tensions related to how recommender systems reveal past
information about their users and how encountering another person’s recommendations affected
service use as these often felt useless.
While the personalised design of many services assumes individualistic use, prior research has
challenged the notion of personal devices and accounts as the norm, especially when it comes
to technology use in the Global South [e.g. 1]. This line of research illustrates how purportedly
personal devices, such as mobile phones, may be shared due to a lack of skills or education, economic
factors, or cultural norms [e.g. 35, 38]. Sharing allows those who do not have their own devices or
lack the skills necessary to use them to still benefit from access to digital technology. When shared,
more people can benefit from a single device [38]. Importantly, Rangaswamy & Singh [35] have also
shown that the sharing of personal devices cannot be reduced to follow only from economic factors
but that it can, rather, be better fitted with and encouraged by cultural practices. For example, in a
study of mobile phone use in India, some households were found to have multiple shared phones
among them, despite tensions that emerged between the norm to share and the personal nature of
the device [35]. Similarly, Ahmed et al. [1] have documented how cultural expectations of sharing —
for example, in situations where a husband surveils the wife’s technology use — clash with desires
for personal use. The authors note that the situation may be further complicated if the devices and
accounts are shared beyond the married couple, as the wife may then have to account not only
for her own actions but also someone else’s use of the device. Similar normative expectations that
women should be willing to let men control their device use in patriarchal societies have also been
discussed by Sultana et al.[45].
Beyond families and households, sharing episodes with personal devices have been studied, for
instance, by Weilenmann and Larsson [47]. Already in 2002, their ethnographic study of teenagers’
mobile phone usage demonstrated how it became a social endeavor in face-to-face situations:
phones did not stay personal but they were handed over and otherwise assimilated into the social
interaction. More recently, co-located use of mobile devices has been studied in an effort to depict
practices of smartphone usage for search, navigation, and messaging [e.g. 5–7]. For example,
Brown, McGregor & McMillan [6] have drawn attention to how interaction with search engines is
interwoven with face-to-face interaction. The authors point out how objects to search for arise
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from conversations among people engaged in co-located interaction. In contrast to these studies
that consider cooperative, co-located practices of smartphone use or device and account sharing
within households, we specifically focus on the question of whose interests are served when people
share accounts in streaming and matchmaking services.
2.2 Agency theory: Principal–agent relationships
The construction of user positions has been discussed in Human–Computer Interaction (HCI)
literature at least since Woolgar’s [49] foundational work on how system designers construct the
user. More recent research has, among other things, drawn attention to how the social media giant
Facebook constructs its ideal user [11] and how location-based social networks may configure the
user in ways that neglect those in rural settings [19]. The concept of a user – as defined by service
designers – is often challenged when we consider empirical accounts of technology use. As one
example, Baumer and Brubaker [3] bring up the indirect use of technology, referring to situations
where individuals use technology on behalf of others.
In agency theory, relationships where one person acts for someone else are referred to as
principal–agent relationships. While discussion pertaining to principal–agent relationships is more
prevalent in agency theory as applied in economics than other social sciences [40], situations where
someone acts on behalf of someone (or something) else are of course not limited to economic
life. Rather, as Shapiro [40] points out, phenomena related to principal–agent relationships may
be less discussed in fields like sociology exactly because such arrangements are so ubiquitous in
everyday human activities. Where prior social scientific research has considered principal–agent
relationships, this has been, for example, in the context of intensive care where agents have to
make decisions on behalf of patients who cannot speak for themselves [41]. These decisions may
be matters of life and death, highlighting the importance of principal–agent relationships.
There are a myriad of situations where we do things on behalf of someone or something else,
rather than acting for ourselves. As individual actors, we are capable of acting for a range of other
actors, including individuals, organisations, and principles [28]. Agents can choose their principals,
that is, they do not act for just anyone but discern between potential options. Meyer and Jepperson
[28] have emphasised that the taking up of different principals is often a rapid, even fleeting, act:
“In fact, a striking feature of the modern system is the extreme readiness with which its
actor participants can act as agents for other actors. They can do this, with rapidity and
facility, as employees and consultants, as friends and advisors, as voters and citizens.
They can do it in exchange for resources, or as a free good to the world around them.“
(p. 107)
Moreover, agents may be serving interests of groups or communities, some of which they themselves
are part of, and others that they are not. Related to this, Shapiro [40] brings up the basic dilemma
of principal–agent relationships: goal conflicts where not only an agent’s personal interests may
be at odds with those of the principal, but the agent may also serve many principals at the same
time, further complicating the issue. This notion invites us to consider agency from a relational
standpoint where agents act in relation to different principals. As another point of tension, the
question of who is serving whom may become problematic when both parties consider that the
other should serve them, such as in the case of policy implementers and entrepreneurs that Niska
& Vesala [30] bring up in their research.
Connecting back to social computing and social media, another type of agents are different
technologies that are – to some degree – capable of acting for interests that their human principals
have defined. As Seaver [39] has emphasised, algorithms are always built by some human(s) to
serve some goal and eventual users may (try to) direct them in line with their own interests:
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“There is no independent software domain from which computers send forth their
agents to insinuate themselves into our cultural worlds. Like any other technology,
algorithms can produce unanticipated results or prove challenging to manipulate, but
they have no wicked autonomy. ... these devices work at the pleasure of people who
can change them, turn them off, or reorient them toward other goals.” (p. 379)
In computer sciences, recommender systems are sometimes conceptualised as personalised
information agents, building on the idea that they are supposed to serve users’ interests by filtering
content for them [e.g. 10, 14]. Yet, these personalised services do not understand rapid changes
in the status of their users and thus act (at best) as rigid agents. Problems stemming from this
rigidness and, moreover, from the lack of reflexivity compared to humans have been discussed in
the context of automated decision making where algorithms have to be corrected by humans to
arrive at acceptable outcomes [e.g. 2, 33]. As a further example of this rigidness, we can think of
instances of algorithmic cruelty where connections created or broken by technology cause distress
to users [e.g. 9, 16]: Brubaker, Hayes & Dourish [8] describe a situation where Facebook reminded
a study participant of their Facebook friend’s birthday, and when they went to congratulate the
friend, they found out that the friend had passed away. Similarly, Pinter et al. [34] discuss how
social media algorithms sometimes deliver hurtful content about users’ former partners.
In the following, we consider both humans and algorithms as agents in the sense of them serving
someone else’s interests. A noteworthy difference between human and software agents is, of course,
that human agents have their own interests which they have to fit with those of any principal they
agree to serve. Software, on the other hand, does not have interests of its own in the same way,
even though those developing and deploying it do [17, 39].
2.3 Goffman’s frame analysis
Finally, we draw from Goffman’s work on frame analysis, following prior work that has built on
the concept of frames in studying technology use [e.g. 15, 18, 32]. Frame analysis, as its name
implies, is not only a theoretical perspective but also a methodological approach. Goffman [13,
p. 8-10] describes frames as providing answers to the question “what is it that’s going on here?”
In other words, Goffman’s approach entails that people answer this question by observing and
interpreting activities through different frames. Frames, then, are a way to organize different
meanings individuals relate to a particular situation. According to Goffman [13, p. 85], frames
incorporate both participants’ responses and the world they are responding to, that is, they are
thoroughly relational. Goffman [13, p. 251-252] called the borders of different frames brackets,
referring to the spatial and temporal markers that indicate where different frames of activity begin
and end. For example, in theater, the closing of the curtains serves as a temporal bracket that
terminates the frame of the play.
One way of using frame analysis as a method is to identify how individuals frame the activities
in which they participate1. An example of how participants can actively change the framing of a
situation is what Goffman [13] calls the keying of frames. When keyed, an activity “is transformed
into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else” (p.
41.) In this study, we approach changes from individualistic use of personalised services to instances
of principal–agent relationships (where another person uses the service on behalf of the account
owner) as reframings of activity in this Goffmanian sense. Here, this transformation is particularly
relevant on the topic of regrounding [13, p.74], which refers to a change in the motivation for an
activity. Regrounding is especially important as it ties together frame analysis and agency theory.
1While we focus on micro-interactional framings, frame analysis has also been used in studies of social movements and
collective action to identify whose or what interests are relevant in the situation [e.g. 4, 26].
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To sum, our analytic approach connects frame analysis and agency theory by incorporating
Goffman’s idea of an answer to what is going on, while also drawing attention to the question
of whose or what interests are relevant in the situation. With the help of this analytic approach,
we consider using a personalised service on behalf of someone else as a regrounding where one’s
private interests are substituted by someone else’s as the basis for action.
3 MATERIAL AND METHODS
We build on a qualitative study comprising 43 written, empirical accounts of sharing personalised
services. We chose a qualitative, exploratory approach given the recurrent and mundane nature of
account sharing and co-use. We consider what kinds of principal–agent relationships come up in
the social situations that participants described, investigating what interests are served by using
these services in differently framed situations and how these situations relate to both past and
future instances of service use. In this section, we, first, describe our research material in more
detail. We, then, discuss our application of Goffman’s frame analysis [13] as the method of analysis
that guides our study of principal–agent relationships.
3.1 Research Material
Our research material comprises 43 written, empirical accounts of sharing personalised services,
collected between November 2019 and May 2020. The majority of these, twenty-nine, were elicited
from students in two university courses, while the other fourteen were gathered with the help of an
online form that we circulated via social media. Overall, our research material is best understood
as a convenience sample that consists primarily of accounts written by young adults.
The student participants were asked to write descriptions of situations where they had either
shared their own or someone else’s personalised service. We offered pens and paper for doing the
task. We explained to the participants that matchmaking and streaming services were of special
interest to us, but that they would not need to limit their descriptions to those. All participants
were provided information on the study and their rights as participants, and we gave them an
opportunity to ask any questions they had, prior to ensuring informed consent. Participation was
not mandatory, and no personal information was collected. For eliciting accounts via the online
form, we provided the same information about the study and participation in written form, and
provided contact details for reaching us in case potential participants had any questions or concerns.
We did not collect any demographic information from the student participants. Those answering
via the web form were given the option to fill in their gender and age, but this was not mandatory.
Based on the responses we got, the online participants (8 female, 6 male, 0 nonbinary) were on
average 32 years old, with ages ranging from 29 to 46. In both settings, participants wrote their
accounts in either Finnish or English. When it comes to translating excerpts from the original
Finnish for presentation in this paper, we have striven at accuracy in both meaning and style.
Written accounts included on average 120 words, with the longest at 336 and the shortest at 25
words. The accounts collected from the classes were somewhat longer (with an average of 143
words) than those collected online (which averaged at 82 words).
Most participants’ written accounts discussed one or more of three services: Tinder (21 mentions),
Spotify (16 mentions) and Netflix (25 mentions). As these three have large user bases in Finland
where the study was conducted, we mentioned them as examples of personalised streaming or
matchmaking services when introducing the study to the participants. This priming may have
played a role in these services becoming the ones participants most commonly chose to write about.
While all three feature personal accounts, Netflix differs from the other two in that it allows users to
set up multiple profiles within one account so as to cater to multiple users. Other streaming services
that were mentioned more than once were HBO (8 times) and YouTube (3 times). Additionally, a
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few Finnish streaming services and some international ones, such as Viaplay and Amazon Prime
Video, were mentioned once each. Tinder was the only matchmaking service that participants
wrote about. Finally, some participants brought up other types of services, including social network
services like Facebook (7 times) and Instagram (3 times).
3.2 Analytic approach and analysis process
We draw on Goffman’s frame analysis [13] to examine how consequences of sharing activities and
the interests served in them may surpass differently framed situations, and how these consequences
are managed by account owners. Differently framed situations are connected over their brackets as
there is an ongoing reality where the resources for particular activities continue to exist beyond
different framings. For example, a Tinder profile continues to exist even after a co-located situation in
which it has been used in a humorous manner has come to a close.What is more, the transformations
that have taken place are not available to everyone who might interact with an account owner’s
profile on the service, such as potential dating partners who are not in on the joke.
Principal–agent relationships as a concept help us understand how individualistic use is reframed
in situations where personalised services are shared socially. From our analytic perspective, princi-
pal–agent relationships are present not only in situations where individuals are using services on
behalf of others, but also when people willingly give others access to their accounts for entertain-
ment or other purposes. These situations can be understood as encounters where individuals share
their personal resources to benefit others or groups that they are part of.
With these analytic starting points in mind, we first analysed the research materials inductively
with open coding. The codes generated during this process include, for example, motivations to
share, what letting someone else use one’s account entailed (discussing on behalf of someone else
in Tinder was one instance of this), playful use, and consequences. The open coding phase was
done with the purpose of getting intimately acquainted with the research materials. After this,
we took on a frame analytic approach, shifting our focus to what kind of interests were served
in differently framed situations, that is, how the use of different services was regrounded [13] in
particular situations. Additionally, we paid attention to the brackets of different frames, that is,
the temporal and spatial boundaries of framed situations. Here, we were interested in what, if
any, management practices were used to regulate these boundaries and what kinds of information
got leaked from one frame to another with the services that were being shared. Additionally, we
considered what kinds of consequences these shifts in frames might have for the account owner.
4 FINDINGS
We have organised our findings into three sections that correspond to the main themes we generated
from our analysis. First, we discuss the motivations that were presented in participant accounts
regarding the sharing of services. Second, we focus on instances of individuals either sharing or
using someone else’s account in a personalised service where the account holder has a profile
that can be used for engaging with other people. In this category, the dating service Tinder was
the most common example that our participants brought up. In the third section, we discuss the
consequentiality of sharing personalised services, focusing mostly on Netflix and Spotify. We
consider both what information services might reveal of the account owner and what kind of
consequences sharing might have for the account owner.
4.1 Reasons for sharing accounts or using them on behalf of another person
In situations where an individual gave their credentials to a service for someone to use on their
own, without co-located interaction, the act was often described as a favor:
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“I have shared credentials to two streaming services and to an online newspaper with
two of my best friends since I use the services sporadically (with the exception of the
newspaper). Sharing the credentials felt nice since if you can make a friend happy with
something like that it’s always excellent and I did not lose anything by doing it”
This excerpt sums up the act of sharing credentials: there is not necessarily a lot to lose by being
generous to one’s friends or family, and acting prosocially may even prompt positive emotions in
the person doing the favor [25].
An interesting related category were exchanges. In these, one person gave their credentials to
one paid system for another person in exchange for gaining their credentials to another system. In
this way, individuals were able to gain access to, for example, multiple different video streaming
services, such as Netflix and HBO, without spending more money. From the perspective of interests,
this act clearly serves both parties of the exchange.
Another reason for sharing credentials to streaming services was convenience, e.g. it is easier to
change a song in one phone rather than swap the phone that is connected to the sound system.
Also, especially in stories where individuals described actions with their partners, a reason for
using the other person’s account was that it was already logged in on a certain device that was
“at the reach of the arm” – easier to access than one’s own. Netflix was often shared with family
and/or partners. A few further stories described helping with setting up a service or demonstrating
how to use it. Moreover, there were mundane scenarios of mutual use, such as watching a movie
from Netflix together with someone. These three categories echo strongly those that Matthews et
al. [27] identified in their study about device sharing in households.
When it comes to Tinder, some participants described sharing as part of an interaction, such
as at a get-together. One participant even characterised their use of the service more as a social
event than an individual one: “We have always used Tinder more like together with my friends, so
the one whose profile is been used, is kind of watching that others won’t do anything ‘stupid’”. In
these cases, the interests served are not only those of the account holder but also of the wider
group participating, as the sharing situation offers an engaging, sociable pastime. There were
also instances where someone was able to experience Tinder usage even if they were otherwise
unable or unwilling to use it, for instance due to being underage, in a serious relationship, or just
uninterested in using it to search for dates for themselves. In these situations, sharing served not
only the principal, but also the interests of the agents who got to experience an activity that they
otherwise would have foregone:
“We ‘played’ a friend’s Tinder in a group. I do not personally use the service so it was
entertaining to see how the application works and especially to spy what kind of people
there are in the service and how they market themselves. We also chose genuinely
interesting candidates for dates to the friend who had not been bothered to use the
application in a long time by themselves. This was done purely as a pastime. It felt
communal to choose suitable and reject unsuitable candidates on behalf of the friend.
It also was entertaining to appraise individuals in the application with our group.”
4.2 Playful and serious transformations
We now turn to discuss the sharing of services in which account owners use their personal profiles
to interact with others, that is, services where users project an identity. In our materials, Tinder
was the most prominent example of this type of service and how the use of one’s profile was
handed over to others, although services such as Instagram and Facebook were mentioned, too.
We categorised these acts of using a service on behalf of the account owner on a continuum from
playful to serious transformations, based on the motivation underlying the regrounding of the
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activity. Sometimes the sharing shifted from somewhat serious to playful in the span of the same
interaction. Principal–agent relationships were most prominent in the instances that we categorised
as serious. Yet, even in playful situations, one can understand the activity in terms of acting on
behalf of another person, as one quite literally assumes another’s identity and, thus, acts as and on
behalf of them in relation to the service and its other users.
4.2.1 Playful transformations. Playful transformations refer to those where someone’s personal
account was used humorously or in a game-like manner. An extreme example of this was an
incident where those involved played a game were participants’ mobile phones (and access to their
accounts on different apps) were used as a resource:
"For a drinking game named ‘Picolo’, This game gives you tasks to do. One of them is
letting somebody else use your phone to write a post. I could use somebody’s phone for
5 min to do whatever I wanted. As we are on exchange I posted a story on the person’s
Instagram saying he was homesick with a lot of emoji’s and gif’s. It was made very
extra so people would see it’s a joke, although people still reacted on it."
Noteworthy here is both the radical transformation of service usage and the meta-language
(e.g.“made very extra”, referring to exaggeration) that was used to mitigate the impact that the
transformation might have outside of the situation.
Another example illustrates how the playful activity was “cut” from regular Tinder usage by
removing unwanted matches after the sharing episode:
“Some months ago me and my sister used each other’s tinder profile for a while. It was
definitely for fun and we both had a lot of matches we had to delete afterwards.”
This removal of unwanted matches acts as a closing bracket for the playful activity. It marks a
point where playful use is brought to a close and the service is returned back to its role as a more
personal tool for engaging with others that the account owner actually wants to interact with.
There were examples of playful transformations, too, where the account owner had not agreed
with the agent’s use of the service. In other words, playful transformations can take place also in
situations where the account owner and those who use the account are not in agreement on what
is acceptable. Others may even use the account purposefully in ways that go against the account
owner’s wishes. For example, here is a case where the agent is not acting in line with the account
owner’s best interests, but rather with the aim of teasing the account owner:
“During high school, my friends had a habit of publishing something to other persons’
Facebook-walls if you lent your phone to them and were logged in to the service”
As such playful usage is not necessarily enjoyable for everyone — especially the account owner
has a stake in what kind of behavior their profile is used for. In case of disagreements, the account
owner might break the playful frame by setting a closing bracket:
"About matchmaking apps, some time ago we used a friend’s account to give likes to
everyone that looked disgusting and talk to them if we had a match, until the owner of
the phone started to get annoyed."
To continue, frame transformations require some amount of agreement among those involved in
the social situation. In the above example, the account owner disagreed on the actions that those
acting as agents made in relation to the account. On the other hand, if the account owner wants
the usage to be playful, the agent is fulfilling their wish when engaging in playful use and thus
serving the principal’s momentary interests.
Moreover, while they were not discussed in the stories participants shared with us, it is worth
noting that there were unwitting participants in the sharing episodes we have described in this
section. For example, Tinder matches who were not present in the face-to-face situation did not
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know that they were actually interacting with an agent of the account owner, rather than the
account owner. From this perspective, these unwitting participants were deceived: they were
bracketed out from the correct interpretation of the situation by their physical (and relational)
location. As such, while there are temporal brackets that mark the rims of when an activity is
transformed into playful, there are also spatial brackets that isolate the playful meaning of an
activity, making it available only to those who are taking part in the sharing episode.
There were differences in the level of fabrication, that is, in the degree to which those outside
of the face-to-face situation were fooled. With Tinder, the milder form of sharing and potential
deception was allowing others to swipe or comment on potential matches under the supervision of
the account holder, whereas in the more severe cases others were also allowed to start or continue
discussions with the matches. These more severe playful transformations were condemned by
only one participant who stated that in their opinion it was okay to swipe and comment on public
profiles in social settings, but that the discussions between matches should be kept private and
not be handed over for an agent to handle. However, as we did not ask participants to reflect on
the moral dimensions of service sharing, our analysis does not encompass participants’ ethical
standpoints on the matter.
4.2.2 Serious transformations. We treat regroundings of activity as serious in situations where
services were used on behalf of the account owner for more than momentary amusement and with
the account owner’s best interests in mind. For example, some descriptions of letting another person
use one’s Tinder profile were described in terms of the agent helping the account owner to find “a
suitable partner” or “a partner of their dreams”. This fits neatly with the idea of a principal–agent
relationship. In these situations, stories often mentioned that the account owner monitored the
agent’s actions in the service. This meant that differences in what an agent considers best for the
principal and what the principal wants can become visible already in the moment of sharing:
"My friend always matched with guys on Tinder who turned out to be. . . unsuitable. So
she gave me her phone so that I could swipe through the guys. I don’t think it worked
though as she was monitoring me. The guys I wanted to swipe OK for her she said no.
And so I just swiped OK on those I expected to be her type."
In these cases, in contrast to the playful uses we discussed above, the sharing situation was not
intended to be cut off from the wider reality. Instead, these situations could be seen as much
more future-oriented: in cases like this, the account owner was open for the interaction to have
consequences beyond the sharing situation. At the same time, this indirect use respected the identity
that the account owner projected to other users of the service. Here, the idea of a human agent
acting for a human principal is in a sense more visible: in these situations, those involved take into
consideration that the account owner has a biography in these services that continues from one
situation to another. So, while an account can be put to different uses in different situations, the
profile in the account has continuity and the principal may monitor the agent’s actions to assure
that the profile is treated in a way that is considerate of this.
Sharing episodes may be extremely consequential. If the activity is not cut from future situations,
these episodes may even alter the life trajectories of the principals. Our research material included
one example that illustrates how an agent’s actions may lead to life-altering encounters if the
account owner is open for the possibilities that a sharing episode may open:
"Approximately five years ago, when my sister was still under-aged and couldn’t
use Tinder by herself I let her use my account. I was already fairly bored with the
application, but my sister found it fun to swipe partner candidates from one side to
another. She often asked for my opinion on the decisions, but every now and then she
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‘gave a heart’ to a person I disliked. Using Tinder together was fun and eventually my
sister chose a man from there with whom I am now married. My sister only made the
choices, never initiated or participated in the conversations."
When it comes to Tinder in particular, based on our analysis, the further the usage situation is
transformed towards a game-like pastime, the more likely it seems that individuals will embark
on bracketing actions to isolate the situation from their ongoing biography in the service. This
echoes prior work on playfulness: already in 1941, Riezler [36] stated that playful behavior differs
from serious on its horizon, that is, playful behavior tends not to be future-oriented. The more an
activity is framed as play, the less it can be seen to serve the interests of those who are bracketed
out of it. In the case of Tinder, these would be the unwitting matches who do not know that the
opposite party is not using the service seriously, or are even unaware that the person depicted
in the profile is not the one they are actually interacting with. In serious transformations where
the agent is acting in line with the principal’s long-term interests, sharing episodes may be more
consequential as the principal may not feel the urge to bracket the episode out of their future.
4.3 Social challenges in sharing personalised services
We now present our findings on how different social situations and relationships are sometimes
intertwined with personalised services in troublesome ways. This manifested itself in services
revealing unwanted information about the account owner and in the sharing of services leading
to less relevant recommendations for the account owner after the fact. Additionally, sharing of
credentials to personalised services sometimes clashed with the changing relationships of the
account owner and others using the credentials, such as when romantic partners had broken up
but still used the same account. In discussing the consequences that sharing personalised services
may have over time, we focus mostly on Netflix and Spotify.
4.3.1 Personalised services and temporal brackets. Personalised services may leak information of
prior use from one frame to another, sometimes with troublesome consequences. First, personalised
features may reveal information about the user of a service like Spotify or YouTube to those who are
temporarily interacting with the user’s account. Second, when others use a service that is designed
for personal use and that provides personalised recommendations based on prior use, this may
result in consequences beyond the intended co-use situation, such as peculiar recommendations
delivered later on to the account owner.
When writing about parties and Spotify, participants sometimes described making preparations,
such as creating playlists. At parties or other social situations, the sharing was often initiated
with the basic act of asking for permission. This can be seen as a rudimentary opening bracket. In
regards to Spotify usage and parties, it seemed that account owners and those who used someone
else’s account took it somewhat for granted that others physically present should have a say on
what music was played. Stories of sharing Spotify in face-to-face situations commonly mentioned
that the password for the device that was used for playing music was shared on request. In one
story, the account owner was asked to add songs to the playlist, rather than handing over access to
the playlist to everyone in the situation. Here, those who share their service — either directly or
by acting as a proxy for others — are not necessarily acting only in line with their own interests.
What is more, acting for the interests of others may bear consequences to the account owner: as
personalised services use the data they collect to make recommendations, information may leak
from one frame to another in unwanted ways. One participant described that it felt confusing to
use their partner’s YouTube as the recommendations offered seemed strange, due to how different
they were from what the participant was used to seeing in their own account. Another participant
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mentioned in a similar vein that using their partner’s account limited the way they could use the
system:
"I sometimes use my boyfriend’s YouTube account when his laptop is around/or con-
nected to the TV, but that is more out of laziness. It’s also not the best because his
recommendations are very different from mine, so it only really makes sense when
I have something in mind that I want to watch because just scrolling and looking at
recommended videos doesn’t always work so well on somebody else’s account.”
Sharing one’s Spotify account in a party may reveal information that the account owner would
prefer not to share. Additionally, sharing can have consequences after the sharing itself has ended:
"I’ve let people use my Spotify on student parties. It’s quite intimidating because I don’t
want them to scroll through my playlist. And the next day Spotify recommends me
“bad” music. But I still do it because music without ads is essential, and apparently not
too many have premium. . . "
Here, the frame of a student party requires that someone acts on the interests of the group by
sharing their personal account. Yet, the prosocial act of sharing one’s account may risk unintended
disclosures and result in making a mess of the user’s personalised recommendations. On a more
positive note, our materials also included examples of individuals sharing their Spotify accounts
with friends so that they could make playlists for the account owner.
If the shared usage is tied to a specific device, other services (that are seemingly irrelevant to the
activity at hand) may deliver information from outside of the frame of the face-to-face situation:
"I have taken my roommate’s phone from a table multiple times (without asking for
permission) in order to change a song from Spotify, but they react really strongly and
insist that I shouldn’t touch their phone even for a moment since ‘I do not know what
there might come for example with a message’"
This example is interesting in that it goes against the general sentiment of participants’ stories:
especially with Spotify, there seemed to be something of a norm among our participants that one
should let others use one’s account in co-located social situations. This norm of sharing brings
some potential risks for unintended disclosures with it: the devices and services shared might
reveal something that the owner would not like to show to others. As the example of the roommate
illustrates, this could, for instance, be in the form of an incoming text message — a type of content
that the owner of the device has scarce control over.
Personalised systems’ incapability to recognise the motivations underlying how they are being
used opens up possibilities for taking advantage of this limitation for social purposes. One participant
shared an example where this rigidity was made use of in an attempt to prank a friend in a playful
manner by regrounding the act of playing music to listen in order to it to more devious motivations
of “training” [e.g. 42] the recommendation algorithm to do something the account owner would
not want:
"Me and my friend got an idea to play Cheek2 on repeat on another friend’s Spotify
account on mute (the friend in question is a professional musician and not a fan of
the artist in question). With this the Spotify algorithm would only recommend similar
music to the friend."
This kind of “fake listening” has been documented before when deployed for the purposes of profile
work [43], whereas our example illustrates its use technically on behalf of another person, but
in effect in a way that turns the algorithm against the account owner’s interests, revealing an
untrustworthy side of the software agent in service of its principal.
2Cheek is a Finnish rap artist.
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In the case of personalisation, this example illustrates how recommendations are thought to tell
something about the person they are aimed at. Since individuals often understand that services
collect data about their behavior, they are also capable of interpreting recommendations offered to
others as reflecting something about them and their prior behavior:
"I have been sharing a Netflix account with my girlfriend, simply because we mainly
watch stuff together and we want to split the costs. But we do have separate user
profiles on the platform, so I suppose our recommendations etc. are not shared. The
other day she was joking “you really don’t have any secrets with this”, alluding to the
fact that she could see what I’ve been watching and what was recommended to me."
While this example mentions that Netflix shows details about past behavior, that is, what one
has been watching, it also mentions the recommendations. Since recommendations do not reveal
specific prior actions, they might be treated as revealing something more general of an individual,
e.g. what movie genres they prefer.
Many of our findings related to unintended disclosure resonate with the insights Sun, Oliviera
& Lewandowski [46] discuss in their article about shared YouTube use. Our findings suggest that
these findings are not related only to a certain type of media (e.g. YouTube videos), but may have
more general relevance across different personalised services.
4.3.2 Relationships and the sharing of personalised services. We now turn to consider how person-
alised services fit together with social relationships over time: what kind of sharing is permissible
based on a particular relationship? What about when the frame of the relationship changes, for
instance when a romantic couple breaks up? Our interest, then, moves towards the frames of
relationships. While we have focused so far primarily on cases of handing over the use of personal
service or device in specific, co-located situations, here, the examples are more commonly about
the co-use of personal accounts, that is, the sharing of credentials to services like Netflix or Spotify.
Giving another person the right to use one’s personalised account can be understood as a favor
that serves the interest of that person. Yet, this might not serve only the interests that the account
owner meant to serve, for instance when the credentials end up in the hands of people who the
account owner would not like to use them. If one considers sharing one’s credentials as a favor and,
as such, an act of an agent in the behest of a principal, limiting who should gain from this act can
be understood as an individual wanting to choose their principal. This relates to the capability of an
agent to choose who they act for (as discussed in the Background). Here, Netflix credentials have
not been shared as part of a face-to-face situation and that introduces a potential complication:
"Apparently, he had forgotten that he gave me his account information and permission
to use it because last time I spoke with him on the phone, he told me that he’s super
annoyed about his friend’s girlfriend who lives in his home country. When I asked why,
he said that he is sure that this girl has been using his Netflix account. He said that
she has watched some stupid TV-shows and messed up with the shows he has been
watching. He even said that he tried to revenge by messing up with the shows she had
been watching, so that she would get confused and wouldn’t know which episode she
is supposed to watch next. When I told my friend that it’s been me all along who has
used his Netflix account, we laughed a lot."
This story illustrates that, at least for some individuals, sharing their personal accounts does not
feel like a cost-neutral act: the sharing itself may have some negative consequences for the account
owner, even if these are not necessarily large. It also shows that the relationship between the
account owner and the person using their account is consequential: a friend’s girlfriend was seen
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to have no right to use the account, while the account owner had no hard feelings towards the
person who wrote the story.
When it comes to acts of sharing, relational boundaries are held up by trust. Our research
materials show how credentials may circulate through trusting relationships to individuals who
have not gained a first-order permission from the account owner:
"My boyfriend asked if he could use my brother’s Neflix which has so-called family
account. I gave permission and every now and then when I log into my account I notice
that he has added content to the favorites etc."
When it comes to sharing credentials, individuals may have limited ways of monitoring others’
usage. The above example illustrates an unclear framing that may arise if the temporal limits of a
sharing episode are not identified properly, be it because of forgetting or because of unauthorised
continued usage. Much like in social media use where people may assume that others share their
understanding of where the boundaries of sharing lie and will do their best not to break them
[23], the sharing of credentials seems to rely on expectations of implicit agreement. This has
the implication that what is considered acceptable is revealed only when someone breaks such
expectations. What is more, individuals do not necessarily honour the explicit or implicit rules that
come with sharing an account. Our materials feature examples where individuals continued to use
services paid by others (e.g. Netflix and HBO) even if they had only received permission to use
them to watch a certain movie or during a certain period. In one example, an individual wrote that
they had given their login details to a friend for the duration that the friend was in a hospital. The
friend had later confessed that they had used the account also afterwards.
Sometimes, it is not the humans but the digital traces within a service that reveal when the
closing bracket has not been honoured. This example shows how implicit rules regarding who has
the right to use an account can be broken and how this may be revealed through digital traces:
"Some months ago, I gave my Facebook account on someone else’s laptop and didn’t
log out. Then weeks later, I saw on Facebook when I wanted to search for one’s name
in the history of search requests that this person had searched for her ex-boyfriend
while using my account."
Having discussed the limits of sharing in the context of who has been given access and for what
period, we now turn to situations where the relationship between the individuals sharing the
service has changed. Many of our participants mentioned sharing video streaming services with
partners or family. However, relationships may end, yet the access to a shared service can continue.
This was brought up in a few stories, such as in this example:
"I still used my former partner’s HBO account after our breakup since they didn’t log
out on my computer. I used it until the subscription ended."
One reason for the need to manage relationships between situations was to avoid negative emotions.
One story described how the writer removed matches that others made with the writer’s Tinder
account due to embarrassment. A phenomenon discussed by Pinter et al. [34] was brought up in our
materials, too: the same writer described how getting Netflix recommendations that were clearly
tailored for their former partner caused distress and made it harder to move on:
“They watched series’ long after we had already gone our separate ways. It sometimes
felt fairly bad when Netflix recommended me series’ based on their watch history
(+notifications when they logged in etc.) Now that I consider it afterwards it really
made it more difficult to get over the relationship”.
To sum, our analysis offers examples of how principal–agent relationships are formed in different
ways and how these relationships may differ in their time span, from momentary sharing to longer
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Table 1. Summary of main findings.
Section Overview of findings
Reasons for sharing accounts or using
them on behalf of another person
Favors, Exchanges, Convenience, Help with set-up,
Demonstrations, Mutual use, Sharing as a part of an
interaction event
Playful transformations in sharing
Usage is carnivalised and serves the purpose of
momentary amusement, Principal’s interests
are served by acting according to their wishes
regarding playful use, Sharing episode is more
likely to be "cut" from future events
Serious transformations in sharing Usage aims to help long-term interests of theprincipal, Sharing episode is allowed to have
consequences beyond the situation
Sharing and temporal brackets Unwanted information may be revealed during thesharing episode, Data collected during the sharing
may affect future usage through recommendations
Relationships and the sharing of
personalised services
Sharing of credentials may be risky as others may
share them further, Individuals do not necessarily
stop using an account as agreed, When relationships
end, account sharing may persist
term arrangements (that sometimes exceed the duration of the social relationship that gave grounds
for the sharing). Individuals both take on the role of an agent in different ways and enlist agents for
themselves. In these relationships, different interests may clash. If we consider the type of software
discussed here as agents that are built to serve a certain kind of user, we also see how human
principal–agent relationships complicate the situation.
5 DISCUSSION
With a focus on principal–agent relationships, we have illustrated how whose interests are served
differ between differently framed situations. We employed the frame analytical concepts of re-
groundings to tie agency theory to frame analysis and brackets to discuss how these situations
are separated from others both physically and temporally. Our main findings are summarised in
Table 1. We also illustrated some techniques individuals use to control the consequences that actions
taken in different frames may have for the future. In what follows, we first discuss principal–agent
relationships in the context of account sharing and moral questions related to the shared use of
personalised services. After this, we return to the issue of how humans and algorithms can both be
considered as agents serving principals. We close with brief reflections on design.
5.1 Serious and playful approaches to principal–agent relationships
While prior research has illustrated that principal–agent relationships may involve questions of
life and death [41], we discovered both serious and playful approaches to acting as an agent for
another person when using personalised services in social situations. In other words, the co-use
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and sharing of matchmaking and streaming services may be playful or serious, playful referring to
situations where the use is undertaken for momentary amusement and is more tightly cut from
future events, and serious to those moments where another individual is using the service with the
account owner’s best interests in mind. Both serious and playful transformations have motivational
regroundings, and especially in the case of playful ones the motivations are typically not aligned
with the uses the service has originally been designed for. As personalised services are often shared
for the purposes of pleasant pastime activity, in many cases as a part of a face-to-face encounter,
account owners willing to let others use their accounts offer something of their own for others to
enjoy. Even the transformations we have described as serious, then, can be a source of enjoyment for
the participants of the encounter, in addition to serving the account owner’s longer-term interests.
Highlighting everyday acts of sharing accounts and devices can be used as one way of challenging
the traditional user position. As mentioned above, Baumer and Brubaker [3] have considered this
type of indirect use as an example of how this position can be afflicted. In this paper, we focused
on similar uses through the lens of principal–agent relationships, illustrating how who the user is
can change rapidly in micro-level interactions. By this, we wished to illustrate how common and
mundane indirect use is and to examine how this is reflected in account owners’ relationships with
personalised services.
An account owner can also be in the position of an agent who, by sharing their resources, acts on
behalf of others. Social situations and relationships may force expectations on individuals regarding
how they should share their access to different services. This may lead to information collected by
these services being revealed to others in unwanted or unexpected ways. Sharing credentials may
lead to unwanted consequences, such as less relevant recommendations, or unwanted users for
the account. Sharing may also be initiated precisely as it may leave a mark from others that has
consequences beyond the situation at hand. This was illustrated with examples of letting others
use one’s Tinder seriously. In such instances, account owners may even actively hope that others’
use of their account would end up being consequential.
5.2 Moral questions regarding the sharing of personalised services
An issue we have not discussed in any detail are the potential moral questions related to the types
of principal–agent relationships that our study illustrates. Principal–agent relationships where
someone uses a service on behalf of another person may have a hint of deception in them, even if
no harm is meant. This was most evident in situations where agents interacted with other Tinder
users on behalf of the account owner, as those matched with the owner did not (necessarily) know
who they were interacting with. Additionally, interactions where an agent is not acting seriously
and is not open about this, as depicted in our discussion of playful use, can easily appear deceptive.
Allowing others to use one’s profile, then, raises questions about a moral dimension of co-located
or shared use of services: where is the line between immoral and moral co-use when we consider
services that are used to communicate with others? Who should get to determine this? Additionally,
service providers have their own ideas of allowable use, often codified in the terms of service.
While there is some contention over whether or not breaking terms of service should or could be
considered as morally wrong, individuals typically do not even read them [e.g. 31]). Our participants
seemed to disregard this aspect completely, typically describing their accounts as if these were
their personal property with which they could do as they wished and considering account sharing
primarily in an interpersonal frame.
A normative expectation to share one’s account sometimes came up in our research materials,
especially in relation to Spotify — there seemed to be particular situations, such as parties, where
norms encouraged sharing and participants had experienced some pressure to share. In other
contexts, such expectationsmay stemmore profoundly from the power structures of the surrounding
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society and take on a moral import that was absent from our research materials. For instance, in
some societies norms may dictate women to share with their husband’s information about their
smartphone usage [45]. Moreover, as smartphones are less common in developing countries than
in Finland where we conducted our study, sharing may be more the norm than the exception also
in settings beyond intimate relationships, for instance due to economic constraints or unequally
distributed access to education [38]. Here, principal–agent relationships may take on a different
form where those who have access to devices and the skills to use them act as access points to
technology use and its benefits for those who would otherwise be excluded.
5.3 Humans and algorithms as agents acting for a principal
We now return to reflect on what it means to consider both humans and algorithms as potential
agents acting for a principal. First, an important difference between these two is, of course, that
humans are capable of reflexivity and algorithms are not [2, 33]. This makes it much easier for a
human agent to react to the changing wishes of their principals. For example, when we consider
playful use of Tinder where a friend acts on behalf of the account owner, it is evident that the
human agent’s flexibility and capability of contextual understanding in relation to the principal is
on a completely different level than what we might expect of a recommender algorithm. Algorithms
cannot understand humorous use and personalised services tend to struggle with recognising
motivational regroundings of seemingly similar looking usage.
Additionally, the services discussed here do not have a model for what frame it is used in and
what interest it should be serving within that frame — and the user cannot communicate this
to the service in any straightforward way. To give a simple example, there is no separate mode
for capturing Tinder use that is taking place merely for the amusement of those in a co-present
situation like a party. Moreover, the prior, more private relationship with the service — the one that
both matchmaking services like Tinder and streaming services like Netflix have supposedly been
designed for — carries over to the sharing situation. Prime examples of this are situations where
a service reveals something that the account owner would have preferred not to share. Human
agents typically make some effort not to reveal potentially embarrassing details regarding their
principals, but services are not capable of assessing what information is appropriate to bring up in
the present company. Similarly, the sharing event carries over to later situations where the account
owner has returned to the usual, more individualistic relationship with the service.
While personalised services are designed with an individualistic perspective of user interests in
mind, our ways of weaving them into our social interactions reveal shortcomings in this approach
to personalisation. Prior work by Sun, Oliveira & Lewandowski [46] demonstrates this in describing
how couples’ decisions regarding what to watch on YouTube had to fit their shared interests. Here,
the recommender system was usually not deemed helpful in achieving a satisfactory outcome.
Human interests are context dependent and it is often in our interest to consider the interests of
those with whom we interact. As Meyer & Jepperson [28] have stated, and as we have discussed
here in some detail, individuals may shift their principals in a rapid fashion as they go about their
everyday endeavours. Yet, while it may feel easy to critique algorithms as agents, humans are far
from perfect, too, when they serve a principal: mistakes are made, and the potentially conflicting
goals between human principals and agents mean that betrayal is possible [40] in a way that we
would likely not attribute to actions performed by an algorithm.
Finally, having discussed problems that recommender algorithms as agents may have in serving
an account owner, it should be noted that the overall impression from our research materials is that
many participants considered recommendations both useful and valuable. After all, there would
be little sense in being annoyed about account sharing leading to irrelevant recommendations, if
the recommendations were always useless! Participants’ mixed feelings echo prior research where
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. 4, No. CSCW3, Article 219. Publication date: December 2020.
219:18 Jesse Haapoja et al.
personalisation has been found to feel pleasurable even in the context of targeted advertisements,
even though individuals may, simultaneously, be annoyed by it [37].
5.4 Reflections on design
While our primary objective with this study was not to generate ideas for design but to contribute
empirically and theoretically to the understanding of account sharing in the context of personalised
services, we close with a brief reflection on what our findings mean in relation to design. First,
our study indicates that there are situations where individuals might value chances to “cut” their
actions from the future. A simple example of this is being able to keep the music played at a party
from impacting one’s algorithmic playlists. Also, based on our analysis, individuals are not naivë
about the consequences of their actions in relation to these services and they are able to recognize
when they are acting on interests other than purely their own. As such, it might be viable to
give individuals more tools to control from which situations data is collected, and allow them to
communicate with the services the relevancy of different data.
Additionally, participants described how they occasionally allowed others to use their credentials
to streaming services for a limited time, but how those receiving the right to use the account did
not always respect such time limits. One participant brought up a tactic for addressing this issue:
the individual who wrote the story described changing their password frequently. This meant that
any permissions granted could not be extended indefinitely by those using the credentials, at least
not without a new act of sharing. While this is something personalised services may not be inclined
to due given their business model, from a purely interpersonal point of view offering the possibility
to create temporary passwords that expire after a specified time period could be helpful.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented a study of how personal accounts on online services — primarily Tinder,
Netflix and Spotify — are shared in both co-located social situations and as a part of ongoing
social relationships. Theoretically, we connect agency theory with frame analysis by incorporating
Goffman’s idea of an answer to what is going on, while also drawing attention to the question
of whose or what interests are being served. Attending to principal–agent relationships, that is,
the tendency and capability to take on different principals and act for their interests, complicates
understandings of the mundane uses of personalised services. These services are built to serve the
interests of an individual user but these account owners sometimes allow others to use the service
on their behalf or use their account to serve others’ interests. In these situations, the service may
inadvertently disclose information that the account owner would prefer not to share. Moreover, acts
of sharing might also have an impact on later, individual engagements with the service, depending
on how effectively sharing episodes are bracketed out. Connecting to the longstanding discussion
within CSCW on how the position of a user is constructed and how it matches with use-in-practice,
our findings illustrate that users’ relationships with personalised services are often complicated by
the different principal–agent relationships that they are involved in.
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